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By Wibren van . der Burg 
I. Introduction 
The debate on the relation between law and morality has been going on 
in jurisprudence for such a long time that one may wonder whether 
anything new could be added to it. Yet, paradoxically, it is unclear what 
precisely is the issue in the debate. According to H.L.A. Hart, positivists 
hold (and their opponents dispute) that there is no necessary connection 
between law and morality; law and morality can be separated. At first 
glance, this seems a simple thesis; David Lyons has shown, however, that 
this thesis is very ambiguous and that, in a minimal mterpretation ofthe 
separation thesis, almost every author, including Aquinas, Fuller and 
Dworkin, would support it.2 Therefore, it may be a good idea to seek a 
new perspective on the debate between positivists and non-positivists. 
A starting point for such a reorientation is formed by the idea that law 
and morality are essentially contested concepts. As the history of moral 
and legal philosophy shows, there are no neutral defmitions of or un- · 
controversial criteria for the correct application of these terms. The 
stances on how to define law and morality are clearly connected with 
substantive philosophical positions. When we take the fact that law and 
·morality are essentially contested concepts seriously, we will be able to 
get a better understanding of the debate between positivists and non-
positivists (as well as an understanding of many othertheoretical debates). 
In this article, I will argue that there are at least two partly incompatible 
models oflaw and, correspondingly, two models of morality. Positivists 
have used one simple, static model oflaw and a similarly simple model 
of morality and, as a result, have been blind to those elements of the 
The research for this paper was partly financed by a Pioneer Grant from the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO).- A dr<tft of this paper 
was discussed at the Danish-Dutch workshop on Ethics in Aarhus; I profited from 
many helpful comments by the participants. Special thanks are due to Henrik Palmer 
Olsen, Frans W.A. Brom, Anton Vedder and Willem Witteveen. 
2 Lyons 1993, p. 70 f. 
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relation between law andmoraHtythat are best seen when using the other 
model. Positivism regards law and morality primarily as systems of 
norms, as bodies of rules and principles which can be formulated as 
propositions (I will call this the "product" model). The central question 
of the debate on law and morality from the perspective of positivism can 
be nicely formulated using positivist terms: Can we separate those two 
systems ofnonns? 
The model oflaw or morality as a system of normative propositions is, 
however, not the only possible one. A second model of law and of 
morality focuses on the activities, the practices and the processes, in 
other words, on the dynamics oflaw and morality. If we take our point 
of departure in this practice model, the relations between law and · 
morality will be seen in a different light. The separation thesis can then 
no longer be upheld. 
This article will start with the construCtion of th¢ two ideal-typical 
models oflaw (Sec. II) and their role in jurisprudential debates (Sec. III). 
Next, two analogous models of morality will be developed (Sec. IV). In 
the light of these models, the separation thesis can be reconstructed in 
two versions (Sec. V). After this analytical groundwork, I will show how, 
in each of the models, the relation between law and morality can be 
described (Sec. VI). Finally, I will point out how the distinction between 
the two models can be of use in various other debates in moral and legal 
philosophy. 
II. Two models of law 
Before elaborating the two models oflaw, it may be helpful to illustrate 
the idea behind the models with an example from a completely different 
field, physics. An electron can be modelled in at least two ways. We can · 
construe it as a very small particle and we can construe it as a wave. Both 
models are helpful in understanding and explaining some phenomena 
with respect to electrons; with both models we also have problems in 
understanding certain phenomena which are better explained by using 
the other model. In other words, they are only partly compatible. It is 
possible to translate ideas from the wave model into the particle model 
and vice versa, but there is usually some loss of meaning and elegance. 
Some phenomena simply cannot be fully grasped in the particle model. 
So far, a unifying model is not available. Every attempt to try to do with 
only one model leads to partial and incomplete theories. To get a full 
theoretical understanding of electrons, we must alternate between the 
two models. 
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This is also the basic idea behind the two models oflaw. Each of them 
focuses on certain characteristics oflawto which the other model is blind 
or has less than perfect sight. The first model focuses on statutes and 
judicial rulings, and on law systematised as a doctrinal body of rules and 
principles; the second model focuses on the practices by which law is 
constructed, changed and applied. Each model can partly incorporate the 
insights of the other model but not all; they are not fully compatible. The 
practice model should not be seen as replacing the product model 
completely, but as a second, alternative model that will enable us to study 
dimensions of law that remain hidden in the product model. Therefore, 
we must alternate between the models to get a full understanding oflaw. 3 
A. Law as a practice 
The model of law as a practice starts with the basic role of law in 
society. When we buy bread or when we teach at a university, law makes 
sense of what we do and sometimes even creates the possibilities for us 
to do what we do. The interaction between the baker and myself when I 
buy bread can only be fully understood by someone who understands the 
legal meaning of this interaction; moreover, it can only take place 
because such an interaction has a legal meaning. In modem societies, law 
permeates social reality; almost every action has a legal dimension. In 
some activities, for example trading, the legal aspect is rather obvious, 
if only because these activities are based on legal concepts such as 
property and sale. In other activities, for example raising children, the 
legal aspect is less obvious, but there is still a legal dimension to these 
activities. They are legally permitted (or prohibited), there are certain 
legal limits to what we may do and there are legal consequences to certain 
actions. 
The legal, in this sense, is not some distinct element that can be 
separated from social reality. It is not a specific characteristic or quality 
of actions, not even a supervenient quality. Rather, it is a way oflooking 
at reality which guides both our actions and our constructive interpreta- · · 
tion of those actions; sometimes the legal framework is even constituted .· 
by our actions. The term "aspect" is helpful here: the aspect cannot b~ .. 
isolated from the whole; it merely offers one way of seeing and under.:, ·· 
: ;·: 
3 There may be other models, though I think these are the most important one~·· '.· 
Will em Witteveen (1996, p. 6) has recently suggested a third model that focwies<>:~ ,. 
the ideals to which law aspires. '··· < :,(/ " 
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standing the whole.4 We can reflect on the legal aspect of our activities 
and confront it with other aspects, as expressed in statements like: 'This 
is an illegal action, though it is morally (or aesthetically) good.' How-
ever, we cannot isolate "the legal" as some distinct entity or sphere or 
characteristic of our actions; the law is not something that is "there". 5 
To make the legal aspect of our actions explicit, we must take a 'legal 
point o.fview' or a legal attitude. 6 This legal point of view is at the core 
of law as a practice. In this practice, we abstract from the legal as an 
inherent aspect of social reality so that legal norms can be explicitly 
formulated and recognised as legal, and can be critically discussed, 
changed or applied. Ifwe focus on the activities of judges, legislators, 
lawyers, legal scholars and so on, law can be fruitfully modelled as a 
practice, as a co-operative human activity. These actors co-operate to 
create law, they change it, interpret and reconstruct it, and apply it to 
concrete problems. However, law as a practice is not limited to the work 
of legal experts. Applying and interpreting law is sometl:].ing every 
ordinary citizen has to do when interpreting human interaction and when 
taking law as an action guide. 7 
It will be clear that "practice" is used here in a very broad sense. A 
practice can be defined as any coherent and complex form of socially 
-established co-operative human activity.8 In fact, we may distinguish a 
number of connected legal subpractices like legislation, court proceed-
ings, legal advice and critical reflection, and creation oflegal doctrine. 
These practices are partly institutionalised in distinct procedures but 
each of these practices is also partly embedded in daily human interac-
tion, when ordinary citizens interpret the law and apply it to guide their 
own actions, when they settle conflicts among one another or with the 
4 The term 'aspect' is only partly helpful, because it suggests a passive observer 
in relation to the object. Social reality is not only observed but also influenced and 
constituted by the participating observers; law is also a way in which we make our 
reality. 
; 5 Cf. Shklar 1964, p. 33. 
6 Compare the central role attributed to 'attitude' in the last paragraph ofDworkin 
(1986, p. 413): 'Law's empire is defined by attitude'. 
:l 7 Cf. Peters 1986, p. 251. 
8 This definition is based on the first part of the definition in Macintyre (1981, 
p. 187 f.). Macintyre distinguishes between practices and institutions as oriented 
towards internal and external goods, respectively; by omitting the second part of 
Macintyre's definition of practice, I have chosen a broader definition that includes 
what Macintyre calls institutions. 
-------------------~-~----------~ 
. ···: .... ,_ : '·,::··~ .~:-· ·~-:---~ ~: < :~:fft~~;¥.g~t/::~. !·~·tt>· ··~ 
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help ofinformal mediators, or when they critically discuss the merits of 
the law on a subject like euthanasia. 
The essential idea of law as a practice is that we do not focus on the 
products of these activities, for example the statutes and judicial deci-
sions, but regard these activities themselves as the law. This may seem 
strange at first sight, but it is not. If we look at science, we can focus on 
the activities of scientists (the practice), or at the theories they construe 
(the product)--: both are called "science". Moreover, in theoretical litera-
ture, the model oflaw as a practice, as a coherent activity, is quite common. 
Lon L. Fuller regards law as a purposive enterprise.9 Antonie Peters 
suggests a model oflaw as critical discussion. 10 And the most influential 
author in jurisprudence since H.L.A. Hart, Ronald Dworkin, regards law 
as an interpretive enterprise and as an argumentative social practice. 11 
B. Law as a product 
' The model of law as a product is probably the most familiar among 
lawyers and the public alike. A question concerning the law of intellec-
tual property will usually be answered with a reference to statutes and 
judgments by courts, or with the formulation of some rules and princi-
ples. In law schools, this certainly is the predominant model: students 
have to learn law from studying the substance of statutes and precedent. 
Most textbooks on subfields oflaw present legal doctrine on a subject as 
a coherent body of rules and principles. Law is thus either a collection of 
texts or a coherent body of norms. 12 Traditionally, this model has been 
referred to by phrases like 'positive law' or 'law in the books'. 13 
This model may be called law as a product. 14 Law as a collection of 
texts is the product oflegislative and judicial activities. Law as a coherent 
9 Fuller 1969, p. 145. 
10 Peters 1986. 
11 Dworkin 1986, p. 90 and p. 14. 
12 Accordingly, we may further subdivide this model into two models, law as a 
collection of textual materiais and law as a thought-construction, but this would 
serve no purpose in this article. In other contexts, the distinction might be useful. 
13 However, law as practice should not be identified with law in action. This 
phrase suggests there is an entity, law, which acts. I would rather prefer to call it 
law-as-action. 
14 I borrow this term from Peters (1993, p. 37), who confronts a product orientation 
in law with a process orientation (which is part of what I call law as a practice). 
· .. ·.,!·'·· .·.: ·. 
-. ---------~---~---------
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body of norms can be seen as a product as well. Legal doctrine is the 
product of constructive activity by scholars and legal officials, not in the 
''real" world of texts but in the world of thought. Legal doctrine does not 
"exist" as some kind ofbrooding omnipresence in the sky, of course, nor 
does it exist in the texts. It is merely a·construction, a product of our minds. 
The latter remark is not entirely an open door. There is a tendency to 
reify law as if it had an existence of its own and, as a result, an objective 
status. We use phrases such as 'The law states', which suggest an 
unequivocal, authoritative meaning.15 We should always be sensitive to 
the fact that it rather reflects the subjective voices of its drafters and 
interpreters. Law as a doctrine is not something "out there", but is the 
product of human interaction, and is inherently controversial in nature. 
Reification conceals this controversial nature and the ambiguity oflegal 
concepts and thus gives legal doctrine an unwarranted objective status. 
In the philosophy of law, this model can be found in the work 'of 
·positivist authors, especially those in the continental legal tradition 
where the great codi:ijcation projects tried to formulate legal doctrine in 
statutes and codes as completely, authoritatively and unambiguously as 
possible. (Hans Kelsen is the clearest example.) It is even more promi-
nent in the way many legal textbooks present their materials, as one 
glimpse in a law section of a book:shop will show. 
m. Debates in juriSprudence as debates between these models 
- -.- ---------
The two models are only ideal-typical models. They focus on two 
different sides oflaw: on how law can be construed as a coherent body 
of normative propositions and on how the specific practices function that 
create, change and interpret those norms and apply them to concrete 
problems. The models are connected and presuppose each other. Law as 
a practice results in (and is orientated towards) law as a product in the 
form of statutes, judicial decisions and other legal texts, but also in the 
form oflegal doctrines formulated by legal scholars. Law as a product is 
not self-contained as if its only goal were to build a coherent system, but 
finds its point of orientation and justification in how it works in practice. 
Most theories in jurisprudence accordingly combine elements :from the 
different models. However, the models are not fully compatible. Another 
example :from physics can illustrate this point. According to the quantum 
15 Peters ( 1986, p. 250) argues that the focus on prevailing doctrines and official 
opinions 'congeal normative options as positive facts'. 
~-----------------------~---------
Two Models of Law and Morality 67 
theory, we can determine exactly either the place of an elementary 
particle or its speed, but not both at the same time. In other words: we can 
have a perfect static view on the particle or a perfect dynamic view, but 
we cannot have both. Law as a product presents a static model and law 
as a practice a dynamic one. We cannot completely cover both the 
dynamic and the stati(( dimensions oflaw at the same time. If we focus 
on law as a coherent body of rules, the ambiguity and controversy, the 
processes of change and argument cannot be fully understood. If we 
focus on law as a practice, we will see how fraught with change and 
controversy law is. This makes it difficult for us to construct a coherent 
legal doctrine, because many norms that we try to construct are not yet 
or no longer settled, and good arguments can be brought both for and 
against many possible formulations. Only by abstracting from this 
controversy and dynamics (and thus selectively representing law) can we 
give a complete picture of law as a product. 
The fact that the two models are not fully compatible, implies that 
every theory of jurisprudence has it::; blind spots, however sophisticated 
it is trying to combine elements from both. Moreover, most theories 
primarily focus on one model, which leads to a relative neglect of 
insights from the other model. This neglect can lead to well-recognisable 
extremes. If law as a product loses contact with the reality of law as· a 
practice, we risk legal formalism or Begriffsjurisprudenz. 16 If we over-
emphasise law as a practice, we may fall prey to a ritualistic pro-
ceduralism (if we reduce the practice to the strict observance of certain 
specified procedures) or forget the importance of the fact that the law 
must not only be good but also certain and predictable. 17 
It seems to me that many debates in jurisprudence, like those between 
natural law and positivism, have remained futile because the opponents 
focus on different models. Each of the positions is defensible as a theory 
that can successfully elaborate the issues for which that specific model 
is most adequate, yet each of them is unable to deal adequately with those 
characteristics in which the other side in the debate has a special interest. 
16 Lyons (1993, pp. 52-53) argues that both formalism and instrumentalism start 
from the questionable assumption that law is fundamentally a linguistic entity, 
which is exhausted by the formulations of authoritative texts and their implications. 
17 The tension parallels the basic antinomy betweenRechtssicherheit on the one 
hand and Gerechtigkeit andZweckmiiftigkeit on the other, which is central to Gustav 
Radbruch's theory of law (which he sometimes regards as an antinomy between 
two elements and sometimes as an antinomy between three elements). I owe the 
helpful comparison with Radbruch to Henrik Palmer Olsen. 
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I will illustrate this thesis with the debate between the two most 
important authors m jurisprudence in this century, H.L.A. Hart and 
Ronald Dworkin. Of course, their positions are much more sophisticated 
and complex than can be discussed in a few lines; I merely hope to show 
that the analytical framework of the two models can enhance our 
understanding of their positions in the debate. 
By constructing law as a set of primary and secondary rules, Hart 
combines the two models in a very sophisticated way. His starting point 
is law as a practice, as a dimension of social reality: he analyses primary 
rules in terms of rule-following behaviour. rs When he adds secondary 
rules of recognition, change and adjudication, these rules are, again, 
analysed in terms of rule-following behaviour, in other words, as 
embedded in practices.19 When conceptualising this behaviour in terms 
of rules and subsequently focusing on the verbal formulation of these 
rules, he shifts to the second model. The system of primary and second-
ary rules consequently tends to obtain a linguistic life of its own, with 
doctrines and open-textured concepts that need interpretation. Rules are 
no longer regarded as regularities in behaviour, but as theoretical 
constructions. The legal concepts and legal rules then become almost 
reified and static; although Hart pleads for openness in the interpretation, 
the rule itself, once formulated, remains the starting point. 20 To take his 
famous example, it only makes sense to discuss whether an aeroplane is 
a vehicle after we have explicitly formulated a norm and recognised it as 
a legally valid norm that vehicles are not allowed in the park. The 
paradoxical result is that, whereas Hart starts his analysis with legal rules 
as grounded in social interaction and explicitly draws attention to the role 
oflaw as a practice, he ends up with the model oflaw as a product. The 
trigger in this transformation is the ambiguity of the central concept of 
rules. Rules can be analysed both in terms of regularities of behaviour 
(the practice model) and in terms of normative propositions (the product 
model). Both interpretations of rules, however, cannot be combined into 
one consistent view. As soon as Hart chooses for regarding rules in terms 
of normative propositions, he loses the possibility of doing full justice to 
the practice oflaw. 
18 Hart 1961, p. 8 ff. In the Postscript to the 1994 edition (p. 255), he explicitly 
calls his theory a practice theory of social rules. 
19 Hart 1961, p. 91 ff. 
20 Hart 1961,p. 129 ff. Compare the criticism by Lyons (1993,p. 86) who argues 
that Hart 'conceives of the law essentially in linguistic terms- as a collection of 
rules with canonical formulations'. 
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Ronald Dworkin's initial criticism of Hart's positivism was tWofold. 
In TakingRights Seriously, the most famous Hne of criticism was that we 
should not construct law as a system of rules only, but also acknowledge 
the importance of principles. He thus tried to show that Hart's product 
model (the so-called 'model of rules') was inadequate in the terms ofits 
own model; in other words, he attempted to present a decisive internal 
criticism. This proved too ambitious and his attack could therefore, 
within the framework of law as a product, easily be countered by 
sophisticated positivists who were willing to admit that law is a system 
of rules and principles.21 
The second, neglected line of criticism started from the question what 
lawyers and judges do when arguing and deciding lawsuits and appeaHng 
to principles.22 In other words, this line focused on law as an interpreta-
tive and argumentative practice, which Dworkin tried to develop as an 
alternative model. This important idea was lost in the ensuing discussion, 
as the result of Dworkin's first attempt to criticise the product model 
from within was something that can only be seen if we step outside the 
product modd. It was the insight that law as a product is something we 
construe in an interpretative activity, and that this activity is as much law 
as is the product.23 In his later work, especially in Law's Empire, this 
second line of argument has become increasingly prominent and explicit, 
but it can already be found in his early work. 
IV. Two models of morality 
In morality, a similar distinction between two models can be made. As 
the basic idea of the two models will now be clear, I will present only a 
brief description. 
A. Morality as a practice 
Morality is, often implicitly, embedded in social interaction and in our 
interpretations of this interaction. For example, medical practice is not 
merely a technical activity, but also orientated towards the patient's 
21 This is also the reply by Hart in the Postscript (1994, p. 259 ff.). 
22 Dworkin 1978, p. 46. 
23 I would submit that many of the inconsistencies in Dworkin's theories correctly 
pointed out by his critics stem from the fact that neither he nor his critics acknowledge 
that there are two partly incompatible models at stake and that therefore every 
theory that tries to deal with both models adequately is bound to be inconsistent. 
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good. Therefore, it makes sense to understand and evaluate the medical 
professional's actions not only technically, but also morally. If we do so, 
we take a moral point of view or a moral attitude. Just like the legal point 
of view, the moral point of view offers a way oflooking which guides 
both our actions and our constructive interpretation of those actions. In 
this moral point of view, we cannot isolate "the moral" as some distinct 
entity or characteristic of our action. 
In morality, there are no institutionalised equivalents of legislation or 
· adjudication. (If there are, especially in religious institutions, this is 
usually a reason to doubt whether these are really morality rather than 
law or some semi-legal institution.) But there is a systematic reflection 
on' and critical discussion of the question whether suggested norms 
should be recognised as moral, how they should be interpreted, con-
structed and modified, and how they should be applied to old and new 
problems. A central part of this practice of reflection and discussion is the 
philosophical discipline of ethics, which is often defined as the system-
atic (or philosophical) reflection on morality. It is not limited to the 
scholarly discipline of ethics, however; it is not institutionalised or 
monopolised by specialised experts. It may flourish in the academic 
sphere but also in public debates. It can fmd a place not only in religious 
practices like sermons or pastoral counselling, but also in discussions 
among close friends. Ethical reflection can be found in many circum-
stances. It is not, as law usually is, an institutionally structured and, 
consequently, distinctly organised practice; it is rather a practice that 
pervades every other practice.24 
I should perhaps add that morality as a practice need not take the form 
of explicit theoretical and critical discussion of moral norms and then 
applying them. It can also be the practice of a living tradition, in which 
traditional values are implicitly or explicitly endorsed, reinterpreted and 
passed on to next generations, simply through setting examples and 
telling stories. It can also be an internalised attitude, in which one does. 
not (or does no longer) reflect on what to do, but simply does what should 
be done. 
24 One may even wonder whether, if it is not distinctly organised, it is really a 
practice. Perhaps in the narrow sense of the term "practice" it is not; but in a broad· 
sense, it is. Individual ethical reflection on separate actions is certainly possible 
Gust like an individual can build a house without the help of others); but that does 
not mean that ethical reflection as such (or building as such) cannot be regarded as 
apractice. · 
·~' 
~=' 
' 
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B. Morality as a product 
The most "tangible" model of morality is that of morality as a product. 
We can construct morality as a set of rules and principles or as a complete 
moral doctrine.25 I think this is the most common way of looking at 
morality: it is a set of precepts that are supposed to form a coherent body 
of norms and values, a moral code. The Ten Commandments exemplify 
this type of morality. 
It is also a very dominant approach in ethical theory.26 The influential 
book by Beauchamp and Childress (1994) is a good example: they 
'believe that for biomedical ethics, which has concentrated on guidelines 
for action, principles and rules are both indispensable and central to the 
enterprise. ' 27 Rawls's theory of justice and utilitarianism are examples in 
the field of political ethics; both present general principles for the basic 
structures of society, elaborate the practical implications, and construct 
a coherent normative theory. Many articles by moral philosophers focus 
on morality as a product: they elaborate the implications of principles 
and rules and the meaning of central concepts; they test them against 
ingenuous (often fictitious) cases; they suggest new distinctions and 
offer conceptual clarification, and so on. 
These two models of morality are ideal types as well. Most sophisti-
cated ethical theories try to combine elements from both models; but 
every theory, in the end, neglects some elements because its primary 
focus is on one of the two. Many discussions in literature on ethics can 
-at least partly-be understood as debates between the different models, 
where one party (often correctly) claims that its opponents are blind to 
insights that are central to its own model. For instance, some critiques on 
Rawls, like those by Alasdair Macintyre, imply that the Rawlsian 
25 Cf. Frankena(l973,p. 8): '[M]orality starts as a set of culturally defmedgoals 
and of rules governing the achievement of the goals.' 
26 Cf. Williams (1985, p. 93): 'The natural understanding of an ethical theory 
takes it as a structure of propositions.' 
27 Beauchamp and Childress 1994, p. 40. It is interesting to see that they assert 
the centrality of principles and rules, at the same time they characterise biomedical 
ethics as an enterprise. This illustrates the fact that the two models are ideal-typical 
and that almost every interesting author, including those who clearly focus on 
morality as a product, tries to combine it with some insights from the other model. 
Cf. Gert (1988, p. 283), where he argues that the moral rules and moral ideals are 
the core of morality as a public system but must be supplemented with an attitude 
· or a procedure. 
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primary focus on the product model of morality neglects the importance 
of morality as a lived practice. Rawls, especially in the third part of 
A Theory of Justice, but also in his idea of reflective equilibrium, 
certainly tries to accommodate many elements that are central to moral-
ity as a practice, such as virtues and intuitions. Nevertheless, the primary 
focus on selecting two basic principles for the political structure and on 
constructing a normati:ve theory for an ideal society makes it impossible 
to do full justice to them. 
V. Reconstruction of the separation thesis 
After this analytical groundwork, it is time to make the models produc-
tive for descriptive analysis. How can these models help us to understand 
the relationship between law and morality? And more specifically, how 
can they help us to understand the debate on the separation thesis? 
We should frrsttryto make out what the separation thesis entails. This 
is not easy because of its ambiguity. In a minimal interpretation, it has no 
distinguishing force at all. Lyons demonstrates this by formulating a 
Minimal Separation Thesis: 'Law is subject to moral appraisal and does 
not automatically satisfy whatever standards may properly be used in its 
appraisal. ' 28 In brief: law is morally fallible. Tenets like this can be found 
in Austin, Hart and many other positivist authors.29 The problem with 
this thesis is that it is too broad: everyone could subscribe to it, including 
anti-positivists such as Fuller and Dworkin. This interpretation of the 
separation thesis, therefore, cannot help us find a distinguishing criterion 
between positivism and its critics; we must construct a more substantive 
interpretation of the separation thesis. A similar remark can be made with 
respect to a second version, also to be found in Hart, stating that law and 
morality are distinct. This, again, is too weak, because almost everyone 
can agree with it.30 We need a stronger idea than that of merely a 
distinction. 
A further problem with the separation thesis is that it is quite unclear 
what is meant by "morality". Usually it is not made explicit, and authors 
28 Lyons 1993, p. 68. 
29 Compare Austin's phrase, 'The existence of law is one thing, its merit or 
demerit another', to which Hart refers as a central positivist tenet both in I 96 I, p. 
203 and in 1977, p. 22. 
30 Cf. Lyons I 993, p. 66. 
.'J 
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seem to switch between different meanings. At least three interpretations 
of morality can be distinguished in the discussion: 
- positive morality: the morality actually accepted and shared by a 
certain social group; 
- normative ethical theory: the general moral standards used in the 
criticism of positive morality combined with a normative theory of 
morality as it ought to be; 
-normative legal theory: the general standards used in the criticism of 
positive law combined with a nonnative theory oflaw as it ought to be. 31 
The distinction I suggest here is obviously inspired by H.L.A. Hart, but 
goes further in two respects. 32 First, it adds the idea of a normative theory 
tocriticalmorality;thusitismadeexplicitthatcriticalmoralityisnotmerely 
negative, but also offers a positive orientation. Second, it introduces a 
distinction between the critical standards used in evaluating morality, 
and the critical standards used in evaluating law. Not every moral standard 
can be translated into law, nor can every legal standard be translated into 
morality. The realm oflove and care holds many moral issues that should 
not be translated into legal norms, and many criticisms of the instrumen-
tal (ab)use oflaw have nothing to do with morality as such.33 
The distinction does, of course, not mean that the three senses of 
morality are separate. There are many connections and in our Western 
societies the three overlap substantially. There is, for example, a dialec-
tical interplay between positive morality and nonnative ethical theory. 34 
On the one hand, most positive moralities include mechanisms of self-
criticism and self-improvement by reflection on nonnative ethical 
theory; on the other hand, the construction of a normative ethical theory 
usually starts from elements of positive morality, like moral intuitions or 
deeply held moral principles and values. There is also a strong connec-
tion between normative ethical theory and normative legal theory. In 
31 For moral philosophers, it may seem strange to call the latter category a 
"morality". However, legal theorists have often identified 'law as it ought to be' as 
a morality or as "morals". The phrase "naturallaw"has a similar ambiguity; it has both 
been used to refer to whati call normative ethical theory and to normative legal theory. 
32 Hart 1975, p. 20. 
33 Clearly, it is an open question what we should regard as distinctive for critical 
legal and critical moral standards, respectively. This is not an empirical issue that 
can be determined with a neutral appeal to facts. I only want to claim that the 
distinction- however it is to be made or justified- is a useful one in discussions 
on the relations between law and morality. 
34 Brom 1998; Den Hartogh 1996. 
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most theories, the aspirations of positive law and positive morality 
should be that the demands of both on the citizen coincide or, in other 
words, that moral and legal obligations do not conflict. This ideal of full 
legitimacy may be unrealisable, but even as an aspiration it leads to a 
strong cohesion and interaction between normative legal theory and 
normative ethical theory. 
The failure to distinguish between these three senses of morality has 
caused much unnecessary confusion. An example is H.L.A. Hart's 
famous article Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. Hart 
discusses the relation between law and normative legal theory ('law as 
it ought to be'), and between law and normative ethical theory or even 
positive morality (all legal systems coincide with morality in respect of 
basic moral principles vetoing murder, violence and theft) without 
noticing that different senses of morality are the issue here. 35 As a result, 
his analysis of the relations between law and 'mbrals' remains 
unsystematic and unclear, because some remarks refer to positive moral-
ity, others to normative ethical or normative legal theory, and it is often 
uncertain which is meant. 
We must be aware of the different senses of"morality", but we need 
not choose between them here. The question is whether any version of 
a separation thesis is valid. All we have to do for that purpose is to study 
. the relations oflaw with morality, where "morality" can have any of the 
three meanings we distinguished. For a reconstruction of the separation 
thesis in this line, we may turn to the work of David Lyons. 
Lyons suggests that at the core of positivism is the Explicit Moral 
Content Thesis: 'Law has no moral content or conditions save what has 
been explicitly laid down by law. ' 36 When courts use moral arguments 
but do not simply deduce these from moral ideas already recognised as 
legally authoritative by legislative or judicial decisions, courts must be 
understood as making new law. 37 Lyons argues that if there is a distinctive 
positivist doctrine on the separation oflaw and morality, it is this thesis.38 
35 Hart 1977, p. 34 and p. 36. In Hart.(1961, p. 188 f.) he explicitly refers to 
conventional or accepted morality when discussing the minimum content of 
Natural Law. 
36 Lyons 1993, p. 83; cf. alsop. 101. 
37 Lyons 1993, p. 80. 
38 Similar formulations can be found in Hart's Postscript (1994, p. 269) and in 
MacCormick (1992, p. 107): 'Positivist theories of law f ... ] hold that law can be 
explained, analysed and accounted for in terms independent of any thesis about 
moral principles or values.' 
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A problem with this version is that it only fits into a product approach 
to law. Only if we regard law as a system of normative propositions, can 
we ask a question about its content. This is no objection as such; neverthe-
less, we should also try to formulate a version of the separation thesis that 
fits into the practice model. An initial formulation might be: In the practice 
of interpreting law, moral arguments are not valid interpretations of the 
law save those arguments that have explicitly been recognised by law. 
This formulation is clearly too broad and therefore too implausible. :in 
the practices oflegislation and discussion between legal scholars, there 
is reference to morality in many ways. In the daily practice of ordinary 
citizens who try to apply law to concrete situations, there is also implicit 
or explicit reference to moral argument. If we want to give this version 
at least some initial credibility, we should make it more specific and 
restrict it to the practice of the courts. A better formulation is: 'In the 
practice of the judicial process, and especially in the practice of judging, 
moral arguments are not valid interpretations ofthe law save when they 
can be deduced from interpretations that have explicitly been recognised 
by law.' If courts nevertheless, as they sometimes do, recognise new 
moral arguments as valid, they must be understood as making new law, 
rather than as interpreting the law. I suggest that we call it the Explicit 
Moral Argument Thesis, because it holds that in the practice of legal 
argument only those moral arguments that have explicitly been recog-
nised are valid. 
VI. Describing the relationships between law and morality 
So far, we have formulated two versions of the positivist separation 
thesis that have at least an initial plausibility without being so broad that 
everyone can subscribe to them. We can now use them as a framework 
to see whether in the practice and the product models they form an 
adequate description of the relations between law and morality. 
A. Law and morality as practices 
Before we can discuss a possible separation, we should determine 
whether law and morality are distinct practices. It is worth noting that this 
depends on the historical development of a society or of a societal sector. 
Primitive societies make no distinction between law, politics and moral-
ity - it is one of the characteristics of modem societies that they are 
differentiated and thus can be distinguished. This means that even the 
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mere distinction between law and morality has only a contingent histori-
cal character. 
A crucial factor in the differentiation process is the emergence of what 
H. L.A. Hart called 'secondary rules'. 39 As long as the normative dimen-
sion of social reality is merely a matter of primary rules, it is impossible 
to distinguish law and morality. The distinctly legal only arises as soon 
as there are secondary rules that can identify the legal dimension in social 
reality. Even if there are such secondary legal rules, however, it is still 
difficultto distinguish the legal from the moral dimensions of reality, let 
alone separate them. There is much overlap; many moral obligations are 
legal obligations as well and vice versa. How should we determine, in 
such cases of overlap, what is law and what is morality? 
Of course, in one sense, we do distinguish the legal and the moral 
aspects. We can say: 'You ought not drive faster than 50 miles per hour 
now' or 'You ought to give money to that beggar'. Itis usually plausible 
that the first sentence refers to the legal aspect and the second to the moral 
aspect of reality; it is ,only certain, however, if we know more about the 
content oflegislation, the moral opinions of the speaker and so on. From 
the utterance by itself, we cannot tell. It could well be that the first 
utterance was meant as moral or prudential (for instance, if the speaker 
thinks it is morally obligatory or wise to obey the law.) We can therefore 
only know for sure what the legal and moral aspects are if we take a legal 
or moral point of view, respectively; in other words, if we take our 
starting point in the secondary rules. As long as we remain merely at the 
level of primary rules, morality and law cannot be separated- in many 
cases they cannot even be distinguished. 
If there is a basis for separating law and morality in the practice model, 
it should thus be found in the secondary rules, and especially in the 
practice of adjudication. This corresponds with the emphasis in the 
Explicit Moral Argument Thesis which we formulated as: 'In the practice 
of the judicial process, and especially in the practice of judging, moral 
arguments are not valid interpretations of the law save when they can be 
deduced from interpretations that have explicitly been recognised by 
law.' Is this a valid thesis? 
The answer depends on the way the practice is structured. There can be 
highly formalised, almost ritualised court proceedings, in which there is 
no room fornormative argument at all. Such practices would have a strict 
separation between law and morality. In our modem Western societies, 
39 Hart 1961, p. 91; cf. also Selznick 1969, p. 5. 
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such ritualised proceedings are, however, uncommon. Actual judicial 
processes include normative argument, discussion, construction of co-
herent doctrine in the light of the available data, and so on. As Ronald 
Dworkin has convincingly argued, in such argumentation processes 
moral and legal arguments fuse. There is no clear demarcation criterion 
to determine when a principle is strictly legal or when an argument is 
strictly moral. Every argument- even if it is openly derived from ethics 
textbooks- could be recognised as legally relevant. We cannot deter-
mine ex ante whether an argument or the formulation of a principle is a 
legal one, or "merely" a moral one that is not legally relevant. Only after 
the decision has been made, can we judge that in this concrete case, it was 
or was not considered legally relevant by the judge -but that does not 
imply that in the next case it will have the same status. 
The conclusion is that, at least for judicial practice in modem Western 
societies, the Explicit Moral Argument Thesis is invalid. A separation 
between legal argument and moral argument is impossible, regardless of 
which ofthe three senses of morality is involved. Arguments from ethics 
textbooks on normative ethical theory may be invoked as well as 
arguments referring to public opinion, in other words to positive moral-
ity. Only after the verdict can we try to determine whether these 
arguments have been accepted by the court, but even then it is often 
difficult to tell. Not every judicial opinion is as elaborately argued as 
those of the American Supreme Court. 
With respect to the distinction between law and normative legal theory, 
we can even go further. The purpose oflegal reasoning is to determine 
how the law ought to be (constructively) interpreted. Consequently, the 
dichotomy between law as it is and law as' it ought to be disappears and 
they merge into one view on how the law ought to be interpreted. An 
attorney will never argue: 'This is the law, but it ought to be different. I 
urge the court to accept that view, which implies that my client should 
be acquitted.' Her argument will rather be: 'Even if some courts have 
mistakenly interpreted it differently, the law should really be interpreted 
as meaning what I tell you, and therefore my client should be acquitted.' 
If a court accepts the attorney's argument, it will seldom acknowledge 
that it changes the law; it will rather say that it now presents a better view 
of how the law ought to be interpreted. 
B. The product models of law and morality 
In the product models, the positivist case for a separation oflaw and 
morality is the strongest. The main body of law as a product is usually 
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easily identifiable by what Ronald Dworkin has called a test of pedigree: 
the fact that a text has been produced or a rule has been announced by a 
legal institution such as the legislature or a judge. There are some border 
problems, like the open texture problem described by Hart or the 
standard cases of customary law and "soft" international law. These 
border problems, however, can be considered mere demarcation prob-
lems; the large core of law is easily identifiable, or so it seems. 
With respect to morality, a similar story seems possible. Of course, 
there is usually no test of pedigree with respect to rp.orality (except in 
some religious moralities). Positive morality can, in principle, be de-
scribed using sociological methods. Normative ethical theory and nor-
mative legal theory cannot be "found" but if we use further qualifications, 
critical theories are easy to describe as well. We can speak of the normative 
ethical theory as constructed in Rawls's A Theory of Justice, of the 
noi:mative ethical theory of rule-utilitarianism or Kantianism, and so on. 
Similarly, we can speak of a Dworkinian or Posnerian normative legal 
theory with respect to abortion or with respect to constitutional rights. 
This means that, in the product model, it is not only possible to 
distinguish morality and law as separate codes, but also to describe them 
without reference to each other. There is no essential connection between 
law and morality. This still leaves open the possibility that there are 
contingent connections. The crucial point, however, is that it is possible 
to describe what the law "is" without reference to morality. This has 
many theoretical and practical advantages. It promises to offer clear and 
objective criteria to determine what the law is; for the description of its 
content we need not refer to morality, save those moral standards that 
have been explicitly recognised by the law. It also enables us to pose 
evaluative questions about the law in a neutral way, such as: 'How should 
we evaluate the moral quality of positive law?,' or 'Do we have amoral 
obligation to obey immorallaws?'40 
So far, the positivist story seems strong in connection with law as a 
product. There is a crucial caveat here, however. The uncertainty and 
ambiguity oflaw is not merely an issue of the penumbra. If we admit that 
law is more than a system of rules and that principles are also part of the 
law, we introduce a crucial element of controversy in the core of the law. 
''Principles and vague normative phrases like 'good faith' are not just 
vague concepts with an open texture. The latter may be true of descriptive 
40 Cf. the discussion in Hart (1961, p. 200 ff.} of the post-World War II 
discussions on Nazi crimes and resistance against the Nazis. 
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concepts like Hart's example of 'vehicle'; but normative concepts and 
legal principles are usually contested concepts. This means that contro-
versy is in the heart of the law, and not merely in the penumbra. It is, 
therefore, not so easy to determine what the law "is" (and a similar 
argument might be made in connection with morality). And, if we cannot 
determine what the law or morality "are", a fortiori, it is no longer 
possible to determine that law and morality are separately identifiable. 
Determining the content of law is not "fmding" it but constructing it, 
deciding in which way to remove the ambiguity, to make vague concepts 
more concrete and to solve conflicts between principles. It therefore 
depends on us, on how we construct law and morality, whether there will 
be a separation between law and morality. The separation is only in the 
eye of the constructor, because it is the result ofhis constructive work. 
The implication for the separation thesis is that the truth of it is merely 
the result of our own constructive action and not a reflection of some-
thing in the world "out there". The Explicit Moral Content Thesis holds 
that law has no moral content or condition save what has been explicitly 
laid down by law, once we have constructively interpreted the law as a 
coherent system of rules and principles. This is true, but only in a trivial 
sense-because we have made it true. The Explicit Moral Content Thesis 
must therefore be rejected as a general thesis about law as it is. 
My conclusion is that, in the end, even in law as a product the positivist 
separation thesis is invalid. Yet, it may play a useful, iflimited role. For 
some analytical purposes, it may be helpful to stipulate that law and 
morality are regarded as if they were separately identifiable systems of 
norms. This stipulation is acceptable because there is at least a core of 
truth in it. It is not the full truth, but it is a partial truth. As long as we 
remain aware that it is merely a stipulation, we can use the separation 
thesis as a tool for analysis. What we should not do, however, is to go 
beyond the restrictions and make it a basic thesis rather than a stipulation 
for modelling purposes. 
The fact that law and morality as a product cannot be separated does not 
preclude that they can be more or less differentiated. The role of 
principles and essentially contested concepts can be stronger or weaker 
and, consequently, the connection with morality can be stronger or 
weaker. Some fields of law have strong connections with morality, for 
instance modem Dutch tort law, where terms like reasonableness and 
fairness ('redelijkheid en billijkheid') play crucial roles. In other fields, 
like traffic law, the connection with morality is weaker or less obvious. 
There are no generalisations possible for law as such: we need detailed 
analyses of specific subfields at specific stages in their historical devel-
'I 
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opment. Dutch tort law at the tum of this century was much less 
intertwined with morality than it is nowadays. The core of truth in the 
positivist separation thesis may be smaller or larger. But the important 
thing is to see that it is always only a partial truth. 
The result of the analysis will be clear. In each of the two models, a 
strict separation oflaw and morality is hard to defend as a general thesis. 
If we focus on law as a product, the separation thesis has a strong core 
of truth, but in the end it should be rejected. Moreover, we only get a full 
picture oflaw if we take each of the two models into account, and in the 
other model the separation thesis cannot be upheld. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the positivist separation thesis is invalid. In both models, 
however, it makes sense to analyse to what degree law and morality are 
interconnected and to what degree their connections are loose. In modem 
societies, they are never fully separate and they are never fully identical, 
but there is a continuum between the two extremes that is worth 
investigating. 
VII. Concluding remarks 
This theoretical analysis is not only of importance for academic 
debates between legal positivists, natural lawyers and Dworkinian 
constructivists, it can also be of practical use. The introduction of the two 
models makes both descriptive and normative analysis more complex-
and more interesting. The distinction between the two models can 
improve our understanding of concrete phenomena. It seems plausible 
that the distinction is particularly fruitful in those fields where .techno-
logical, social and legal developments are rapid, because alternating 
between the two models will help us understand dynamic processes. The 
development ofbioethics and health law since the 1960s offers such an 
example, which I have elaborated elsewhere.41 
The two models may not only be important for understanding and 
describing the relationships between law and morality; I suspect that they 
are equally important for normative theory, even if the initial effect of the 
introduction of the two models will often be that simple views on many 
issues are seen as unconvincing and one-sided. I have suggested above 
that the debate between liberals and communitarians can be understood 
41 The two models of Jaw constitute only one of the factors that we need to 
understand the variation; for a fuller account of the development see Vander Burg 
(1997). 
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better if we regard it as an argument between authors like Rawls, whose 
primary perspective is that of the product model, and authors like 
Macintyre, whose primary perspective is that of a practice model. 
Philosophical discussions of topics like civil disobedience and legal 
moralism, to mention just two other issues in normative theory, have so 
far usually taken a product-model view. I suspect that they also become 
more sophisticated if we alternate in the analysis between product and 
practice views. 
These are only some tentative suggestions in which directions the two 
models might be made productive. The two central theses of this article 
have been more modest. First, I have shown that the two ideal-typical 
models are both helpful and necessary in understanding and describing 
law and morality and the relationships between the two. Ifi am right that 
they are partly incompatible, this means that we have to alternate 
between both models when we want to describe law and morality. 
Second, the positivist idea of a separation between law and morality can 
be a useful stipulative assumption at most, but never an empirically valid 
thesis. The falsity of the separation thesis, however, does not imply the 
truth of natural law. Whether natural law or some form ofDworkinian 
constructivism is to be preferred, is still open. My hope is that the 
distinction between the two models will also offer a new starting point 
for that debate. 
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